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SPEECH REGULATIONS 
Sarah N. Rosen∗ 
The First Amendment has a special regard for those who swim against the 
current, for those who would shake us to our foundations, for those who re-
ject prevailing authority. 
 
—Steven H. Shiffrin1 
 
On November 4, 2008, the American people elected Barack Hus-
sein Obama the forty-fourth President of the United States.  In the 
wake of a war in the Middle East and the collapse of the American 
economy, voters embraced Obama and his message of hope and 
change.  Celebration erupted across the country and around the 
world.  Electricity was in the air; the tide was turning. 
Not everyone, of course, approved of Obama’s election.  Support-
ers of his opponent, Senator John McCain, voiced their disapproval.  
In Ohio, McCain supporter Angela Senters told reporters, “My boy-
friend is so upset, he said he’s going to go over to Kentucky and join 
the Ku Klux Klan . . . . My boyfriend said now the world is going to 
end in 2012 and that Obama is the antichrist.”2 
Yes, these comments express a racism generally frowned upon by 
modern American society.  But, more importantly, his comments sig-
nify his disapproval with the official elected to lead his country—they 
exemplify political dissent.  He may voice his criticisms of the newly 
elected administration without fear of prosecution for doing so.  
America’s Founding Fathers adopted the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States in part for that very purpose—to al-
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 1 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 10 (1999). 
 2 Posting of Christine Jindra to Openers:  The Plain Dealer’s Ohio Politics Blog, 
http://blog.cleveland.com/openers/2008/11/in_heavily_republican_butler_c.html 
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low the free flow of ideas and the clash of opinions without fear of 
government retaliation. 
Not all American citizens, however, were free to participate in the 
robust debate surrounding Obama’s election.  On November 5, 2009, 
Captain Justin Robertson3 of the United States Army woke up, 
donned his uniform, and drove to his Spanish class at the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI), the Department of Defense’s linguist train-
ing school.  DLI students are not actively assigned to any operating 
brigade, nor are they involved in any of the ongoing operations of 
the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 
Upon arriving at DLI, he was informed that, as the highest rank-
ing officer in his class, he needed to deliver a message to his class-
mates.  The message indicated the kinds of comments about the elec-
tion that were or were not “appropriate” for military personnel to 
make in their personal discussions.  According to Robertson, he was 
to inform his classmates that Obama’s official title was now “Presi-
dent-Elect Obama” and any disparaging remarks about him were for-
bidden by military commanders.  Regardless of the political beliefs of 
any of the individual service members, the military would not allow 
criticism or disapproval of the new Commander-in-Chief.  Just as sol-
diers were expected to support George W. Bush throughout his ten-
ure as the head of U.S. military operations, they also were expected to 
support Obama as President-Elect.  Political dissent, the cornerstone 
of the First Amendment, would not be tolerated. 
Political speech, and dissent in particular, occupy a revered place 
in American ideology.5  Steven H. Shiffrin defines dissent as “speech 
that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or au-
thorities.”6  Free speech functions as a “cultural symbol to promote 
tolerant attitudes in American society.”7  The ability to criticize the 
government was of particular importance to the Founding Fathers, 
who disliked the idea that the government might remain unchecked 
 
 3 Name has been changed. 
 4 See Presidio of Monterey Tenant Units, http://www.monterey.army.mil/tenants/
tenants.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 5 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 927–28 (3d ed. 
2006) (noting scholars’ criticisms of whether the marketplace of ideas was rational for 
freedom of speech (citing C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
(1989) and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786 (2d ed. 1988))). 
 6 SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at xi. 
 7 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 87 (1990) (cita-
tion omitted). 
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by popular opinion.8  This idea remains entrenched in American 
minds.  Political dissent provides an avenue for accountability of pub-
lic officials, an inspiration for social change, and a way for individual 
citizens to define their personal identities—both by allowing them to 
express and to solidify their own opinions9 and by exposing them to 
the opinions of others.10  Those who work within the government are 
arguably in the best position to criticize that government because 
they are best acquainted with its policies and practices. 
Similarly, the men and women of the American military are ar-
guably in the best position to criticize the ongoing war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  These men and women have been subject to multiple 
deployments and extended tours and have experienced firsthand 
what most of us only observe on television.  But these men and 
women are the only members of American society prohibited from 
engaging in political dissent by critiquing the war or the Commander-
in-Chief.  Service members risk their lives to protect the freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and yet these freedoms are denied to 
them by military regulations. 
In this Comment, I argue that current military regulations restrict-
ing free speech—in particular, those that prohibit political dissent—
impermissibly infringe on the First Amendment rights of the men 
and women in the armed forces.  The Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (UCMJ) and Department of Defense directives effectively elimi-
nate a service member’s right to participate in political discussion or 
dissent—in substance, if not in form.11  The regulations prohibit even 
off-duty service members from voicing their opinion against an in-
cumbent administration or protesting a war in which they must par-
ticipate.12 
I suggest that federal courts should review military free speech 
regulations through the public employee rubric.  While public em-
ployees sacrifice some freedoms that citizens in the private sector en-
joy by virtue of their public employment, First Amendment jurispru-
 
 8 See, e.g., PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 71–75 (1999) (noting 
that members of the Constitutional Convention pushed for limits on governmental power 
in the form of the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment). 
 9 This view of the First Amendment is known as the “Liberty” or “Autonomy” theory, and 
will be discussed in further detail in Part III.B.2. 
 10 This view of the First Amendment is known as the “Marketplace of Ideas” theory and will 
be discussed in further detail in Part III.B.2. 
 11 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 1344.10, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY THE ARMED FORCES 
ON ACTIVE DUTY para. E3.2, E3.3 (2004) (listing certain activities that service members 
may or may not participate in while on active duty). 
 12 U.C.M.J. art. 88 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006)). 
878 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
dence indicates that the government cannot abridge its employees’ 
right to speak unless that speech interferes with the function of the 
government entity.13  If courts reviewed military regulations through 
this lens, only speech that directly affected the functioning of the 
American military could be silenced.  For example, officers in a com-
bat zone would not be allowed to tell their troops that they should 
not go into battle.  But an off-duty officer would be allowed to attend 
a peace rally to express his dissatisfaction with the government’s ac-
tions and express his dissent—a right that scholars and judges 
throughout American legal history have deemed fundamental. 
In Part I of this Comment, I discuss the history of the UCMJ and 
the current status of military regulations on free speech.  I also note 
the Supreme Court’s highly deferential stance toward military regula-
tions and its reluctance to implicate itself in such a controversial reg-
ulatory area. 
Part II outlines public employee free speech doctrine.  I explain 
how the Court has settled on the conclusion that “the First Amend-
ment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to 
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”14  While pub-
lic employees’ free speech rights are curtailed more than the rights of 
privately employed citizens, they generally are permitted to speak on 
public issues if their speech will not significantly affect their institu-
tional employers’ ability to do their jobs.  This doctrine balances the 
interest of the employee in exercising his First Amendment rights 
and the interest of the United States in maintaining functioning gov-
ernmental agencies. 
In Part III, I discuss the implications of the Court’s “hands-off” 
approach to military regulations that infringe on the rights of service 
members and argue that resolving these cases under the public em-
ployee doctrine would provide more just results by allowing the mili-
tary to prohibit speech that directly interferes with military objectives 
but permitting speech that would not.  I discuss the ways in which the 
military’s arguments are undermined:  by First Amendment theoreti-
cal principles, by the broad application of the public employee doc-
trine to agencies involved in national security, and by the dangers 
posed by taking too deferential a stance to military regulations. 
 
 13 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (noting that restrictions on em-
ployee speech “must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s 
operations”). 
 14 Id. at 417. 
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I.  MILITARY RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH 
In contrast to the free and uninhibited debate allowed to Ameri-
can civilians, the military has significantly curtailed the rights of men 
and women in the armed services to engage in political dissent.  This 
section describes military speech regulations and cases in which the 
Supreme Court has reviewed those regulations.  In almost all cases, 
the Supreme Court defers to military commanders, who claim that 
political dissent by service members poses a grave threat to national 
security and the efficiency of the military as a whole. 
A.  Summary of Military Regulations 
1.  Pre-UCMJ Regulations 
Prior to World War I, members of the military and civilian com-
munities alike generally accepted the authoritarian nature of military 
regulations.15  The major weapon in the arsenal of military justice, the 
court-martial, existed separate and apart from the federal judiciary.16  
For years, the Supreme Court refrained from defining the scope of 
the court martial, allowing military tribunals to apply the Articles of 
War, the governing body of law, as they wished.17 
Then came World War I.  Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, the 
Acting Judge Advocate General, attacked military law as unconstitu-
tional and began a two-year fight to protect the individual rights of 
soldiers.18  Arguing that they were “courts all the same,” deriving their 
authority from the U.S. Constitution, Ansell argued that the vision of 
military courts as executive branch puppets was an outdated carry-
over from the “British model of civil-military relations.”19  In his view, 
 
 15 JOHN M. LINDLEY, “A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CITIZEN”:  THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY 
JUSTICE, 1917–1920, at 8 (1990) (describing an incident where both civil and military 
leaders reluctantly agreed to the Army’s insistence on a trial by court-martial for soldiers 
that participated in race riots). 
 16 Id. at 8–9 (quoting William Winthrop defining the court-martial as an “agency of the ex-
ecutive department” and “instrumentalit[y] of the executive power”). 
 17 Id. at 11 (“In the absence of a more definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, Win-
throp’s theory of courts-martial would continue to dominate American military law.”); see 
also id. at 42 (discussing the Articles of War as the basis of American military justice). 
 18 Id. at ix (describing Ansell’s criticisms of military law, believing that a soldier deserves all 
legal protections under civilian law). 
 19 Id. at 31. 
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a soldier did not sacrifice his right to constitutional protection simply 
by joining the military.20 
Ansell was opposed fiercely by Major General Enoch H. Crowder, 
who argued that “the real purpose of the court-martial is to enable 
commanders to insure discipline in their forces.”21  The military in-
terest in discipline outweighed the soldiers’ interest in exercising 
their constitutional rights.  Crowder’s conservative view revived origi-
nal ideas about the military’s domination of its soldiers.22  The War 
Department agreed with Crowder, unsurprisingly, and Congress re-
jected Ansell’s progressive ideology based on the Department’s rec-
ommendation.23 
World War II marked the next occasion for public scrutiny of the 
American system of military justice.24  Congress adopted the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950, finally incorporating many 
of Ansell’s proposals, in an attempt to ensure that soldiers might ex-
ercise their constitutional rights.25 
2.  The UCMJ’s Prohibitions on Speech and Political Dissent 
Despite the UCMJ’s more expansive view of service members’ 
rights, the military still infringes on the fundamental liberties guaran-
teed by the Constitution.  The four main provisions used to curtail 
the freedom of speech are Article 88 (Contempt toward officials), Ar-
ticle 92 (Failure to obey order or regulation), Article 133 (Conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), and Article 134 (General 
article).26 
Article 88 is the most restrictive of the UCMJ’s prohibitions on 
speech.27  Rooted in seventeenth century British anti-treason laws,28 its 
 
 20 Id. at ix (“Ansell believed that the soldier, whether a long-service regular, a volunteer, or a 
draftee, was also a citizen who deserved all the legal protections possible under civilian 
law if he faced trial by court-martial.”). 
 21 Emily Reuter, Second Class Citizen Solders:  A Proposal for Greater First Amendment Protection for 
America’s Military Personnel, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 318–19 (2007). 
 22 Id. at 319. 
 23 Id. 
 24 WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFORM 
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 3 (1973) (discussing the context and history of public and go-
vernmental scrutiny of military law). 
 25 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2006) (armed forces legislation).  For a discussion of how General 
Ansell’s legal ideas and theories were incorporated into the Uniform Code, see, e.g., 
LINDLEY, supra note 15, at 2. 
 26 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 319. 
 27 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006).  See also Reuter, supra note 21, at 320 (calling Article 88 “the arti-
cle most offensive to the First Amendment”). 
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initial manifestation in the U.S. military was as Article 19 of the Arti-
cles of War.  Notably, all prosecutions under Article 19 were politi-
cal—all focused on punishing comments critical of President Abra-
ham Lincoln and his management of the Civil War.29  In its modern 
form, Article 88 forbids commissioned officers from using “contemp-
tuous words against” the President and other government officials.30  
The UCMJ does not define contemptuous.31  Service members may 
even be prosecuted for opinions expressed privately.32 
Thus, Article 88 essentially prohibits any man or woman in mili-
tary service from voicing negative opinions of the President, his ad-
ministration, or his handling of foreign policy.  The military may 
prosecute “personally contemptuous” opinions expressed during po-
litical discussions.33  Most importantly, Article 88 leaves soldiers un-
able to voice their criticism of a war in which they are forced to par-
ticipate.  Military officers fear retaliation if they express their 
opinions, and their speech is effectively chilled.34  Also, there is no 
exception for comments made out of uniform; even comments made 
off-duty may be prosecuted. 
Article 92 prohibits disobeying a general order or regulation.35  
Orders are presumed legal.36  While the UCMJ notes that orders can-
not infringe on the individual rights of soldiers without “valid military 
purpose,” federal courts unquestioningly accept “maintaining good 
order and discipline” as a valid purpose.37  As Emily Reuter notes, 
“[t]he focus of the military adjudicators is that the accused violated 
 
 28 See John G. Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President:  An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1697–99 (1968) (tracing Article 88 back 
to the sixteenth century and describing the same offense prohibited by British treason 
laws as well as the UCMJ). 
 29 See MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW 73 (1999) (noting the po-
litical nature of Article 19 punishments for treason as the predecessor of Article 88). 
 30 Id. at 72–73.  To convict a service member under this article, the government must prove 
only that the defendant was a commissioned officer and that he or she used “contemptu-
ous words against an enumerated official or legislature” in office at the time the defen-
dant spoke, “which became known to someone else.” Id. at 73. 
 31 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006). 
 32 DAVIDSON, supra note 29, at 73 (suggesting that while the UCMJ notes that private expres-
sions “should not ordinarily be charged,” it does not ban such prosecutions entirely). 
 33 Id. (noting that Article 88 does not usually apply to political opinions so long as the opin-
ion is not “personally contemptuous”). 
 34 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 322 (describing how Article 88 chills officers’ free speech). 
 35 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006) (prescribing court-martial punishment for service members who 
fail to obey orders or regulations). 
 36 DAVIDSON, supra note 29, at 67–68. 
 37 Reuter, supra note 21, at 322. 
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an order; scrutiny of whether the order or regulation’s restriction of 
free speech is actually constitutional is lost.”38 
Article 133 prohibits conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman.39  This article covers conduct that “dishonors and disgraces 
the officer, compromising that person’s character or standing as an 
officer.”40  Like Article 92, Article 133 may also punish private con-
duct.41 
Article 134 punishes all conduct that endangers military discipline 
or that could bring the armed forces into disrepute.42  Military com-
manders use this catch-all provision, along with Article 133, to prose-
cute speech that might not specifically be prohibited by other UCMJ 
articles but that, in their view, is inappropriate for a military setting.43  
The military considers speech or conduct discrediting if it “has a ten-
dency to bring the service into disrepute or which tends to lower it in 
public esteem.”44  These provisions effectively give military prosecu-
tors unlimited authority to charge any offense they deem “discredit-
ing,” without any checks and balances on their discretion.  The mili-
tary may argue that any speech critical of a war or of military policy 
“tends to lower it in public esteem,” and courts, adopting their usual 
deferential standard, will not interfere. 
3.  Department of Defense Directives Aimed at Silencing Dissent 
The military also impedes free speech rights through Department 
of Defense (DOD) orders.45  For example, DOD Directive 1344.10 
prohibits types of political speech, including:  “participating in parti-
san political campaigns,” working for partisan organizations, and par-
ticipating in any broadcast or “group discussion” as “an advo-
cate . . . of a partisan political party, candidate, or cause.”46  Service 
members may, under the Directive, “express a personal opinion on 
political candidates and issues,” as long as expressions do not contain 
 
 38 Id. at 322–23. 
 39 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006) (“[C]onduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be pu-
nished as a court-martial may direct.”). 
 40 DAVIDSON, supra note 29, at 79. 
 41 Id. 
 42 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006). 
 43 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 323. 
 44 DAVIDSON, supra note 29, at 80 (quoting MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 
para. 60c(3) (1995)). 
 45 Reuter, supra note 21, at 323. 
 46 Id. 
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“contemptuous words against the officeholders” as defined under 
UCMJ Article 88.47 
This Directive seems outrageous to any proponent of the First 
Amendment because the Directive orders, in substance if not form, 
all members of the armed services to voice their support for the in-
cumbent administration.  This type of direct manipulation of public 
opinion is usually seen in authoritarian dictatorships, not nations that 
take pride in their progressive democracies.  The military justifies 
these regulations as necessary to maintain order and discipline and to 
keep the military in high esteem.48  Arguably, however, the military 
would be viewed in greater esteem if it did not deny its members their 
basic constitutional rights. 
B.  Military Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court takes a very deferential approach to military 
regulations that limit the rights of service members, generally refus-
ing to sit in judgment on military actions.  Claiming to use a balanc-
ing test when evaluating military speech regulations, the Court weighs 
the government’s interest in ensuring effective military operations 
against the interest of the individual service member’s right to speak.  
The military interest in maintaining order, discipline, and national 
security almost always triumphs, even when the regulations in ques-
tion do not interfere with military operations.  While a few decisions 
indicate that the Court may be open to a stance more compatible 
with the general public employee doctrine, the majority of Supreme 
Court decisions—or, just as notable, the Court’s silence in the face of 
the regulations—allow the military a free reign over its operations.  I 
will discuss the more deferential cases first, followed by cases where 
the Supreme Court has indicated an inclination to apply traditional 
First Amendment reasoning to the restrictions. 
1.  Cases in Which the Supreme Court Completely Defers to Military 
Judgment 
The first, and only, case ever tried under UCMJ Article 88 is United 
States v. Howe.49  While off-duty and out of uniform, Lieutenant Howe 
 
 47 Id. at 323–24 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 1344.10, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
BY THE ARMED FORCES ON ACTIVE DUTY para. E3.2, E3.3 (2004)). 
 48 See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 29, at 80 (noting that these Articles punish acts that 
“tend[] to lower [the military] in public esteem”). 
 49 17 C.M.A. 165 (1967). 
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attended an anti-war rally.50  According to the court, he carried a sign 
that read “‘Let’s Have More Than a Choice Between Petty Ignorant 
Facists in 1968’ and on the other side of the sign the words ‘End 
Johnson’s Facist Aggression in Viet Nam,’ or words to that effect.”51  
Comparing Article 88 to laws against mutiny employed by the British 
Royal Forces, the Military Court of Appeals held that Article 88 did 
not impermissibly infringe Howe’s First Amendment rights.52  This 
case did not even get to the Supreme Court; the limits of the consti-
tutional rights of service members were left in the hands of the mili-
tary itself. 
Many military speech cases, like Lieutenant Howe’s, do not even 
make it into the federal appeals system.  The military has sole discre-
tion over most speech issues, and prosecution of service members for 
political speech remains rampant.53  As the Supreme Court has de-
ferred to the military in evaluating speech regulations, the military’s 
test involves essentially the same interests as the Supreme Court’s test.  
Military courts ask whether the speech in question “interferes with or 
prevents the orderly accomplishment of the mission or presents a 
clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, mission, or morale of the 
troops.”54  Unsurprisingly, military courts almost always find against 
service members when evaluating free speech claims. 
The first case dealing with service members’ First Amendment 
rights to reach the Supreme Court was Parker v. Levy.55  The “land-
mark decision for deference in the context of servicemembers’ First 
Amendment rights,” Parker solidified the Supreme Court’s “hands-
off” approach to military regulations during the height of the Viet-
nam War.56  Captain Howard Levy, an army physician, refused to train 
Special Forces (SF) medics.57  Calling the SF members “liars and 
thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and chil-
dren,” Levy vehemently criticized the war and specifically urged black 
 
 50 Howe, 17 C.M.A. at 168; see also Reuter, supra note 21, at 320. 
 51 Howe, 17 C.M.A. at 168. 
 52 Id. at 174. 
 53 See, e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (prosecuting soldier under 
Article 134 for wrongfully advocating anti-government and disloyal statements); United 
States v. Blair, 67 M.J. 566 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2008) (upholding conviction of member 
of armed forces for promoting Ku Klux Klan); United States v. Ogren, 54 M.J. 481 
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (upholding conviction of officer under UCMJ who said he wanted to 
harm the President); United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564 (1972) (upholding conviction 
of officer under Article 134 for circulating pamphlets critical of Vietnam policy). 
 54 United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 395 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 55 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
 56 Reuter, supra note 21, at 330. 
 57 See Parker, 417 U.S. at 736. 
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soldiers to disobey direct orders from commanders and to refuse to fight 
the war.58  The military prosecuted Levy under UCMJ Articles 90, 133, 
and 134.59 
Declaring the military to be an entity unto itself,60 the Court ap-
plied a miraculously brief First Amendment analysis.61  Justice William 
Rehnquist quoted an earlier case’s reasoning for limiting the free 
speech rights of service members: 
In military life . . . other considerations must be weighed.  The armed 
forces depend on a command structure that . . . must commit men to 
combat, not only hazarding their lives but ultimately involving the secu-
rity of the Nation itself.  Speech that is protected in the civil population 
may . . . undermine the effectiveness of response to command.  If it does, 
it is constitutionally unprotected.62 
Applying this reasoning, the Court found Levy’s speech unpro-
tected because it interfered with the effective operation of the mili-
tary.63  To allow officers to disobey their commanders and to tell their 
men not to fight an ongoing war would contravene the most funda-
mental goals of the American military machine. 
Goldman v. Weinberger also exemplifies the Supreme Court’s defer-
ential attitude toward military regulations.64  Simcha Goldman, an Or-
thodox Jew and ordained rabbi, joined the Air Force as a clinical psy-
chologist.65  Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-10 prohibited wearing 
“headgear” indoors, and Goldman was prohibited from wearing a 
 
 58 Id. at 737.  Levy’s comments were quoted at length by the Court:   
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War.  I would refuse 
to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so.  I don’t see why any colored soldier would 
go to Viet Nam:  they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to 
fight because they are discriminated against and denied their freedom in the 
United States, and they are sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by be-
ing given all the hazardous duty and they are suffering the majority of casualties.  
If I were a colored soldier I would refuse to go to Viet Nam and if I were a colored 
soldier and were sent I would refuse to fight. 
  Id. at 736–37. 
 59 See id. at 737–38. 
 60 Justice William Rehnquist’s analysis began by declaring military society as unique:  “This 
Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate 
from civilian society.  We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, 
developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history.”  Id. at 743. 
 61 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 331. 
 62 Parker, 417 U.S. at 759 (quoting United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570 (1972)). 
 63 Id. at 761. 
 64 475 U.S. 503 (1986).  Goldman focused on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment rather than the Free Speech Clause, but the Court’s deferential stance did not 
change. 
 65 Id. at 504–05. 
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yarmulke.66  Goldman challenged the regulation under the First 
Amendment.67 
The Court flatly rejected Goldman’s claim.  It noted that the mili-
tary has a specific interest in establishing uniformity because soldiers 
need to feel as though they are a part of something bigger; they must 
be able to sacrifice their lives for the greater good, and the military 
believes that eliminating individuality makes this easier.68  Justice 
Rehnquist completely deferred to the military for the wisdom of this 
idea, writing: 
The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent 
that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amend-
ment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedi-
ence, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.  The essence of military 
service “is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual 
to the needs of the service.”69 
The Court essentially adopted the military’s justifications without 
hesitation or even a brief analysis of whether the justifications had 
any merit.  The opinion, however, did acknowledge that the need for 
uniformity does not eliminate all First Amendment rights of service 
members.70 
Most recently, the Army prosecuted Lieutenant Ehren Watada 
under Article 133 for criticizing the Bush administration and for pub-
licly refusing orders to deploy in Iraq.71  Watada called the war “mani-
festly illegal” and claimed that joining the deployed forces would 
make him guilty of committing war crimes.72  The Army prosecuted 
Watada under Article 133 in a military court, but the proceedings 
ended in a mistrial after the judge rejected a pre-trial stipulation.73  
The Army initiated new trial proceedings against Watada based on 
the same statements, which Watada challenged as double jeopardy.74  
Solicitor General Elena Kagan recently withdrew the appeal,75 likely 
 
 66 Id. at 505. 
 67 Id. at 506. 
 68 Id. at 508. 
 69 Id. at 507 (citations omitted). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 320–21.  The Watada case has received a lot of attention in 
the press, with journalists across the country rallying for less restrictive speech regula-
tions.  See, e.g., Sarah Olson, Army Attempts to Redefine Free Speech, ALTERNET, Jan. 2, 2007, 
http://www.alternet.org/story/46142/. 
 72 Olson, supra note 71. 
 73 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 321.  See also Kim Murphy, Army to Discharge Officer Who Refused 
Iraq Duty, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A14. 
 74 See Reuter, supra note 21, at 321. 
 75 See Jeremy Brecher & Brendan Smith, The Trials of Ehren Watada, THE NATION, May 19, 
2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090601/brecher_smith?rel=hp_picks. 
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because of double jeopardy considerations.  Watada’s case has reig-
nited the debate over military speech regulations76 and provides proof 
that the military’s overzealous prohibitions of political dissent still 
operate to chill the speech of service members. 
The First Circuit recently applied the “hands-off” stance to 10 
U.S.C. § 654 (2000), commonly known as the controversial “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy (DADT), in Cook v. Gates.77  Under DADT, the 
military may discharge service members for engaging, or possessing 
the propensity to engage in, homosexual conduct.78  While not a case 
about political speech, the Court’s treatment of DADT exemplifies 
the Court’s deferential approach to speech regulations.  The military 
justifies the policy for similar reasons to those advanced in Goldman:  
uniformity and cohesiveness among troops is necessary to an efficient 
military and, therefore, the protection of national security.79  The 
First Circuit held for the military.80 
Discussing the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, the court noted 
that “our review of military regulations challenged on First Amend-
ment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of 
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”81  The court 
proceeded to find for the military, despite the fact that the govern-
ment had produced no evidence showing that the presence of homo-
sexual soldiers in combat situations has any impact on military opera-
tions. 
 
 76 See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Officer at Fort Lewis Calls Iraq War Illegal, Refuses Order to Go, SEATTLE 
TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A1 (reporting on Watada case); John Kifner & Timothy Egan, Offi-
cer Faces Court-Martial for Refusing to Deploy to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at 19 (“Critics 
say the lieutenant’s move is an orchestrated act of defiance that will cause chaos in the 
military if repeated by others.”); Olson, supra note 71 (discussing restrictiveness of mili-
tary speech regulations in light of the Watada prosecution). 
 77 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 78 See Shannon Gilreath, Sexually Speaking:  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the First Amendment after 
Lawrence v. Texas, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 953, 954 n.7 (2007) (citing U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS, at encl. 3, 
para. E3.A1.1.8.1.1 (1994)). 
 79 Cook, 528 F.3d at 60.  The regulation allows military members to use some “expressive 
conduct” as an “evidentiary apparatus to measure an individual’s likelihood of engaging 
in homosexual sex acts.”  Gilreath, supra note 78, at 957.  Thus, if a service member says 
the words “I am gay,” the military may take that statement as indicative of future homo-
sexual conduct and discharge the service member.  See Cook, 528 F.3d at 64. 
 80 Cook, 528 F.3d at 65. 
 81 Id. at 62 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)). 
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2.  Supreme Court Cases Applying Less Deferential First Amendment 
Analysis 
A few instances exist where the Court adopted an approach more 
compatible with general First Amendment analysis and more in line 
with the public employee doctrine.  In Greer v. Spock, the Court up-
held a restriction banning political candidates from campaigning on 
a military base because the regulation did not discriminate based on 
the individual candidates’ political beliefs.82  The Court analyzed this 
ban as it would a similar ban posed by any institution.  While this case 
did not directly involve the rights of service members, it does indicate 
that the Court is willing to apply standard First Amendment analysis 
to cases involving the military. 
The Court also applied a public employee-type of analysis to mili-
tary regulations in Brown v. Glines.83  The regulation at issue in Brown 
required Air Force members to get commander approval before cir-
culating petitions criticizing Air Force policies.84  The Court found 
that the regulation was not intended to infringe on freedom of 
speech and did not restrict speech any more than necessary to 
achieve the important government interest of an effective military 
and the unique demands of “discipline and duty” required by military 
life.85  The Court recognized that a commander should have some 
control over the distribution of materials that might undermine his 
ability to maintain morale, discipline, and readiness.86  The opinion, 
however, “preserved civilian spaces and the political process as ave-
nues of expression for servicemembers.”87  The Court recognized that 
speech prohibited by the regulation would not interfere with military ob-
jectives if it took place in a civilian context.  Thus, the Court implicitly ac-
cepted that the government’s interest in maintaining effective mili-
tary operations is not necessarily implicated by the criticisms of off-
duty service members. 
 
 82 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976). 
 83 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
 84 Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(1) (June 12, 1970). 
 85 Brown, 444 U.S. at 354–55 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974)). 
 86 Id. at 356. 
 87 Brief for Tobias Barrington Wolff et al. as Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Professors in 
Support of Appellants at 21, Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (Nos. 06-2313 & 
06-2381). 
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II.  PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Generally, public employee speech doctrine holds that “the First 
Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circum-
stances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”88  
First Amendment jurisprudence limits public employee speech rights 
more than it limits the rights of citizens not so employed.89  By enter-
ing the public service, a public employee voluntarily relinquishes 
some of the freedoms retained by citizens working in the private sec-
tor90 because the government has a vital interest in “the effective and 
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.”91  Tradition-
ally, the Supreme Court viewed this interest as paramount to any in-
terest held by a public employee and afforded no remedy to public 
employees when their employers infringed upon their constitutional 
rights.92  Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts in 1892, declared, “[a policeman] may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a po-
liceman.”93 
The Supreme Court has repudiated this view in a series of deci-
sions handed down over the last sixty years.94  Culminating in Pickering 
v. Board of Education and its progeny, the Court has delineated a test 
that adequately represents the government’s interests while simulta-
neously recognizing and protecting a public employee’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.95  Recognizing that an Amer-
ican does not relinquish his citizenship by joining the public service,96 
 
 88 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). 
 89 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–73 (1968) (articulating balancing 
test for evaluating employee speech); see also United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 
U.S. 75, 94 (1947) (noting that public employees’ rights must be balanced against the 
state’s interest in “orderly management” of personnel). 
 90 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by ne-
cessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.”). 
 91 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). 
 92 See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892) (asserting that a 
police officer cannot challenge the terms on which he voluntarily accepted employment). 
 93 Id. at 517. 
 94 This series of decisions began with cases involving loyalty oaths in the wake of the Red 
Scare and expanded to cover a wide range of public employee speech.  See, e.g., Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 573 (finding teacher’s free speech interest outweighed school’s concerns); 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190–92 (1952) (holding that public employers can-
not require employees to take an oath denying prior involvement with the Communist 
Party). 
 95 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (holding that teachers still retain their First Amendment 
rights to comment on matters of public interest). 
 96 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“[A] citizen who works for the govern-
ment is nonetheless a citizen.”). 
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the current test seeks to balance “the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the in-
terest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”97  At the heart of 
the test lies the fear that speech about sensitive public issues—speech 
which lies at the very center of First Amendment protection—will be 
chilled because employees fear retaliatory dismissal for their actions 
by employers who view such speech as “subversive.”98 
As a threshold consideration, the court determines whether the 
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.99  A matter 
of public concern is one of “political, social, or other concern to the 
community,”100 and the employee must not be speaking in his official 
capacity.101  If the court answers this question in the affirmative, then 
the court considers whether the government agency has a valid rea-
son for silencing the employee in question.102  Any restrictions im-
posed “must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect 
the entity’s operations.”103  If the Court finds that the employee did 
not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, then the gov-
ernment has more discretion over what speech it may prohibit to effi-
ciently manage its offices.104 
While the Supreme Court has not specifically defined “matters of 
public concern,” the term seems to refer to topics that are important 
to public debate.105  The Court has recognized taxes, the functioning 
of the school system, and whether employees feel pressured to sup-
 
 97 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 98 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). 
 99 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (outlining test for determination of public employee free 
speech rights); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (noting that 
whether a citizen speaks as matter of public concern is a threshold inquiry). 
100 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
101 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (noting that employees’ speech is not protected from em-
ployer discipline if made pursuant to their “official duties”). 
102 See id. at 418 (outlining the second step of analysis as determining that the “relevant gov-
ernment entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from 
any other member of the general public”). 
103 Id. 
104 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
105 See, e.g., id. at 149 (noting that the issue of whether public employees are pressured to 
work for political campaigns in their workplace is a matter of public concern); Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968) (finding that a school funding scheme is a 
matter of public concern and “vital to informed decision-making by the electorate”).  Ad-
ditionally, the Connick Court listed a few topics which might qualify as matters of public 
concern:  whether the DA’s office was not competently completing its duties to investigate 
and prosecute criminals, government corruption, or “breach of public trust.”  Connick, 
461 U.S. at 147–48. 
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port political candidates as such.106  Whatever the precise definition, 
the Court has left no doubt that political dissent qualifies as a “matter 
of public concern.” 
A.  Public Employee Speech Cases 
1.  Public Employee Doctrine, Generally 
Public employee free speech doctrine as it now stands began to 
coalesce in Pickering.107  Pickering, a teacher at a local public school, 
wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing a series of proposed tax 
increases to pay for building new schools.108  The letter also accused 
the superintendent of the school district of trying to silence teachers’ 
opposition to the project.109  The School Board fired Pickering after 
the newspaper ran the letter.110  Pickering challenged the dismissal as 
an unconstitutional violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.111  Recognizing that public employees are citizens as well as 
agents of the state, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach 
to accommodate both Pickering’s interest in freedom of speech and 
the State’s interest in effectively providing a public service.  Focusing 
on the context in which Pickering spoke (publicly, in a newspaper) 
and the content of his speech (criticism of a school board policy), the 
Court found that Pickering’s letter did not compromise the State’s 
interest in maintaining an effective school system.  Central to the 
Court’s decision were the facts that (1) Pickering spoke outside the 
workplace, so his speech was less likely to have a direct effect on the 
operation of the school112 and (2) his speech concerned school fund-
ing, an issue of general public concern.113  The Court called “[t]he 
public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of 
public importance” the “core value of the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment.”114 
 
106 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (finding pressure to work for campaigns matter of public 
concern); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72 (discussing taxes and school funding). 
107 391 U.S. 563. 
108 Id. at 566. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 565. 
112 Id. at 574 (“[When] the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially in-
volved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we con-
clude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he 
seeks to be.”). 
113 Id. at 571. 
114 Id. at 573; see also Ross G. Shank, Speech, Service, and Sex:  The Limits of First Amendment Pro-
tection of Sexual Expression in the Military, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1132 (1998). 
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The Supreme Court extended Pickering to apply to private com-
munications of grievances as well as public ones in Givhan v. Western 
Line Consolidated School District.115  The Court stated that the constitu-
tional freedom of speech is not “lost to the public employee who ar-
ranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to 
spread his views before the public.  We decline to adopt such a view 
of the First Amendment.”116 
The Court refined public employees’ speech rights in Connick v. 
Myers.117  Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers was informed she 
would be transferred to another section of the criminal court.118  
Myers opposed the transfer and voiced her objections to it.119  She dis-
tributed a questionnaire to fifteen fellow ADAs to gauge opinions on 
office policies, including whether employees felt pressured to work in 
political campaigns.120  Subsequently, Harry Connick, the District At-
torney, fired Myers, who challenged the dismissal on the grounds that 
it violated her First Amendment right to free speech.121 
The Court stated that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses 
a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”122  
The opinion loosely defined what constitutes a matter of public con-
cern:  “[M]atter[s] of political, social, or other concern to the com-
munity.”123  Viewing the record in its entirety, the Court held that 
most of Myers’s questions related purely to private grievances.124  The 
Court concluded that Connick was justified in firing Myers because 
he reasonably believed her actions would significantly impair his abil-
ity to run the DA’s office efficiently.125 
The Connick Court also recognized that the time, place, and man-
ner in which an employee speaks bears relevance to its constitutional-
 
115 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
116 Id. at 415–16. 
117 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
118 Id. at 140. 
119 Id. 
120 Other topics included in the questionnaire included the office transfer policy, office mo-
rale, the need for a grievance committee, and the level of confidence in office superiors.  
Id. at 141. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 147–48. 
123 Id. at 146. 
124 See id. at 154. 
125 Id. (declaring that the First Amendment interest does not require the employer to toler-
ate employee actions that “would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy 
close working relationships”). 
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ity.126  In a footnote, the Court stated that “[e]mployee speech which 
transpires entirely on the employee’s own time, and in nonwork areas 
of the office, bring different factors into the Pickering calculus, and 
might lead to a different conclusion.”127 
The latest development of public employee doctrine is Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.128  Ceballos, a Deputy District Attorney, wrote a memo rec-
ommending dismissal of a case because a search warrant had been 
authorized on false representations.129  Ceballos then was transferred, 
and he claimed that this action was in retaliation for his memo.130  
The Court found that Ceballos wrote the memo pursuant to his offi-
cial duties, and therefore the memo was not protected under the First 
Amendment.131  The opinion also recognized that restrictions on em-
ployee speech must be narrowly tailored to the government interest 
of maintaining effective operations, and that any restriction must be 
aimed at speech that would impair the agency’s execution of its du-
ties.132 
2.  Employee Speech Cases and Political Dissent 
Restrictions designed to silence political dissent are impermissible 
infringements on the First Amendment rights of public employees.  
In a cluster of cases following Pickering, the Court held that discrimi-
nation against public employees specifically because they express po-
litical beliefs violates the First Amendment.  In Elrod v. Burns, the Su-
preme Court held that dismissal of nonpolicymaking and 
nonconfidential state employees solely because of their political af-
filiation is unconstitutional.133  The Court later extended Elrod to ap-
ply to public defenders134 and to hiring decisions.135  A public em-
ployee’s private political beliefs only may be considered as grounds 
for dismissal if those beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his 
 
126 Id. at 152. 
127 Id. at 153 n.13. 
128 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
129 Id. at 414. 
130 Id. at 415. 
131 Id. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Con-
stitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). 
132 Id. at 418 (“[T]he restrictions . . . must be directed at speech that has some potential to 
affect the entity’s operations.”). 
133 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976). 
134 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
135 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
894 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
workplace obligations and this would likely only occur if an em-
ployee’s position focused on policymaking.136 
The Supreme Court specifically protected expression of personal 
political opinions in Rankin v. McPherson.137  McPherson and other 
employees in the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas dis-
cussed the assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan.  McPherson 
stated:  “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”138  Rankin, 
the Constable, did not share McPherson’s political sentiments and 
fired her.139  The Court found the speech protected—despite the fact 
that the speech occurred in the office, the Court found that she was 
speaking as a citizen, not a member of the Constable’s office.140  The 
opinion noted that Rankin had produced no evidence that the com-
ments impacted the function of the office and stated that disparaging 
comments made about the President would not impede law enforce-
ment.141 
By creating a protected zone around political speech, these cases 
show that the Court recognizes the right to political speech in the 
workplace as a fundamental one and will only allow it to be infringed 
in extreme circumstances. 
Also relevant is the fact that police and other state and municipal 
law enforcement officers are generally subject to the same regulations 
as other public employees.142  Local law enforcement bodies are the 
civilian or domestic equivalent of the military:  smaller in scale, cer-
tainly, but generally providing the similar services of protecting citi-
zens and societal order.  Notably, courts have found that the public 
employee doctrine serves both the interests of the officers in protect-
ing their First Amendment rights and the interest of the state in 
maintaining an effective police force. 
3.  The Hatch Act 
The Hatch Act, enacted in 1940 and amended in 1993, restricts 
political activity of citizens employed in the executive branch of the 
federal government or the District of Columbia government, as well 
 
136 Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 519.  Branti also confirmed that Elrod’s holding is not so limited to 
only apply to cases of political coercion.  Id. at 516. 
137 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
138 Id. at 381. 
139 Id. at 381–82. 
140 Id. at 392 (holding that the employee engaged in private speech, and since her duties 
were mainly clerical, it would not affect the employer’s functions). 
141 Id. at 388–89. 
142 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees §§ 227–28 (2008). 
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as some state and local employees who work in federally funded pro-
grams.143  The Hatch Act distinguishes between employees who may 
participate in partisan political activity and those who may not.144  
Employees prohibited from engaging in partisan activity may not take 
an active role in a partisan campaign, such as making campaign 
speeches, collecting funds for a particular candidate, or circulating 
nominating petitions.145  Agencies in charge of national security fall in 
the latter category.146 
Congress justifies this prohibition on political expression by de-
claring that partisan ties disrupt the efficient operation of govern-
ment bodies by leading to favoritism, bias, and animosity within gov-
ernment offices.147  The Supreme Court has upheld this reasoning 
against First Amendment challenges.148  The cases upholding the 
Hatch Act, however, have dealt almost exclusively with direct in-
volvement in partisan elections.  The Act allows even employees sub-
ject to heightened requirements as a result of their involvement in 
sensitive security matters to engage in political discussions, express 
opinions about candidates and issues, and attend political rallies.149  
Through the Hatch Act, Congress has specifically recognized the right 
for government employees to engage in political dissent because such 
activity does not impair the efficient functioning of governmental 
agencies.  Additionally, it indicates that Congress does not believe 
such dissent will impede the function of agencies charged with de-
fending national security. 
While the Hatch Act does not apply to military personnel, Con-
gress’s determination that political dissent does not impede govern-
ment functions lends support to the argument that the public em-
ployee doctrine embraces all forms of political dissent. 
 
143 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–26 (2006) (applying provisions to federal employees); see also 5 
U.S.C. §§ 1501–08 (2006) (applying provisions to state and local employees). 
144 Id. 
145 U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 7 
(2005). 
146 See id. at 3 (listing the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and National Security Council as some 
of the agencies subject to heightened speech restrictions). 
147 See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973) 
(stating that government entities must “enforce the law and execute the programs of the 
Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the 
members thereof”). 
148 See, e.g., id. at 568 (holding prohibition on political management or participation in po-
litical campaigns constitutional); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 97 
(1947) (finding prohibition on campaigning constitutional). 
149 U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, supra note 145, at 7. 
896 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Summary of Deference to Military Regulations 
The Supreme Court has intense reservations about making judg-
ments in the realm of military regulations.  The Court has rarely in-
tervened or attempted to stay the hand of the military in any way, 
even in the face of regulations that, without adequate justification, in-
fringe on constitutional liberties.  Why has the Court been so defer-
ential? 
The most frequent reason the Court cites for deferring to military 
judgment is what Shannon Gilreath calls the “Defense is Different” 
explanation.150  As Gilreath points out, the Court upholds otherwise 
unconstitutional regulations in part because “(1) the military is a very 
special environment requiring an especial surrender of personal lib-
erty and (2) military officials have superior expertise to determine 
how the proper balance between uniformity and personal liberty is 
struck.”151  The Court consistently declares the military as a separate 
society, distinct from civilian life, that requires its own set of rules and 
regulations.152  Because the military’s central objective is to fight wars 
and to be prepared for attacks against the homeland, greater restric-
tions on military personnel are tolerated than would be on civilians.  
Military generals have much more experience with military discipline 
and with hostile situations than Supreme Court justices do, and the 
justices believe they should not substitute their inexperience for 
those of military commanders when making decisions that affect the 
nation’s security.153  Using inflammatory language about the necessity 
of defending the country and the importance of national security,154 
the Court seems to portray nearly every military regulation as essen-
tial to American safety.155 
 
150 Gilreath, supra note 78, at 963. 
151 Id. 
152 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); see also Shank, supra note 114, at 1118–19 & 
n.128. 
153 See Parker, 417 U.S. at 748–49. 
154 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (justifying regulation that 
prohibited a Jewish Air Force psychologist from wearing a yarmulke in violation of his re-
ligious beliefs because “[t]he inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience 
to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with mili-
tary procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection” 
(quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (alteration in original))). 
155 It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has rejected the general “national security” 
interest as too vague a basis on which to restrict the free press under the First Amend-
ment.  N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (per curiam) (Black, J., con-
curring). 
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Another reason for judicial deference, which complements the 
“defense is different” idea, is that the consequences of a judge’s 
wrong decision in the area of military regulations could have drastic 
consequences.156  Denying a citizen his constitutional rights is a terri-
ble thing, but an ineffective military might have catastrophic conse-
quences for the entire nation.  These concerns are real, and they are 
serious.  However, they do not justify the infringement of rights that 
have nothing to do with the function of the military, its training, or its 
operations. 
The “defense is different” argument clearly applies to many mili-
tary situations.  Judges, despite their wealth of knowledge, cannot 
possibly understand the necessities of a war zone or the best way to 
train troops.  However, the Court should take a much closer look at 
the regulations imposed on service members.  Some of the regula-
tions the Court reviews have little or nothing to do with military op-
erations.  Most importantly for this Comment, the Court ignores the 
fact that speech that occurs outside of the military, when soldiers are 
out of uniform, in discussions with friends or classmates, may also be 
penalized by military rules. 
Judges also claim that they are really deferring to Congress, not to 
the military.157  Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to create laws governing the military.158  The 
Court claims that its “hands-off” attitude toward the military is a result 
of its desire to avoid infringing the lawmaking powers of Congress.159  
This justification is entirely manufactured.  Congress does not have 
the power to create laws that infringe the constitutional rights of 
American citizens.  The Court has repeatedly struck down laws that 
restrict free speech rights, holding that Congress cannot enact legisla-
tion that impermissibly prohibits the exercise of the First Amend-
ment.160  The Court’s claim that it does not want to get in Congress’s 
way in the case of military regulations that restrict these very rights is 
incongruous with its prior First Amendment holdings. 
 
156 See Shank, supra note 114, at 1121. 
157 See Parker, 417 U.S. at 756; see also Shank, supra note 114, at 1119. 
158 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
159 Parker, 417 U.S. at 756. 
160 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (declaring federal Child 
Pornography Act of 1996 unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed on free 
speech rights). 
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B.  Criticism of Deference:  Applying Public Employee Doctrine Would Allow 
the Court to Be Less Deferential While Still Serving Military Interests 
As a consequence of the judicial “hands-off” policy toward military 
regulations, the rights of men and women in uniform are impermis-
sibly infringed.  The government interest used to justify the myriad 
regulations in place is to have an effective military.  I do not attempt 
to undermine the seriousness of this goal or the importance of hav-
ing a strong, efficient military to protect the interests of the nation.  
What I do question is the Court’s justifications for how the regula-
tions achieve this end.  Regulations that prohibit military personnel 
from engaging in off-duty, out-of-uniform, non-combat-zone political 
commentary outside of their official capacity as soldiers in no way 
serve the interest of promoting military efficiency.  On the other 
hand, regulations that prohibit speech that does interfere with military 
operations—speech like that in Parker, which directly encourages sol-
diers to refuse to fight a war, or that encourages mutiny—do support 
this interest.161 
By removing discretion over speech cases from military courts and 
viewing military regulations through the public employment rubric, 
the Court would weigh the interest of the employer—the military—in 
maintaining a functioning agency, against the interest of the speaker.  
Regulations that directly impact the function of the military can, and 
should, be upheld.162  But regulations that do not implicate the mili-
tary should not—especially those that restrict soldiers’ ability to en-
gage in political dissent, speech the First Amendment strongly pro-
tects. 
Applying this test to military speech regulations will achieve more 
just results in many ways.  First, this type of review is more consistent 
with First Amendment theory, which suggests that dissent is invalu-
able to society and should be suppressed only in extreme circum-
stances.  Second, courts already apply the public employee doctrine 
to practically every government employer, including other agencies 
charged with protecting national security interests.  In these deci-
 
161 Parker, 417 U.S. at 736. 
162 See Danley K. Cornyn, Note, The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Internet:  Preserving Op-
erational Security and Servicemembers’ Right of Free Speech, 87 TEX. L. REV. 463, 483 (2008).  
Cornyn suggests applying a balancing test “similar” to that of public employees when 
dealing with electronic military communications.  Id.  Cornyn’s suggestion is a good start-
ing point for improving military speech regulations, but she merely skims the surface of 
the issues at stake.  She does not discuss the theoretical or practical implications of apply-
ing public employee doctrine exactly as it is, nor does she recognize the dangers that ac-
company the Court’s current deferential stance. 
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sions, lower courts recognize that political agreement will not lead to 
insubordination or jeopardize national security.  To extend similar 
protection to the military would not be a drastic measure; rather, it is 
a logical extension of current judicial practices.  Third, deference to 
the military has backfired in the past.  The military must be held ac-
countable to ensure that it does not abuse its power. 
1.  Practical Application of the Public Employee Doctrine to Military 
Regulation 
If the Court were to apply the public employee doctrine to mili-
tary speech regulations, the Court would first decide whether the ser-
vice member in question was speaking as a citizen on a matter of pub-
lic concern.  If a service member was not in uniform, not actively in 
combat, or not on a military base, prior decisions indicate that the 
Court would find that he was speaking as a citizen.  An ongoing war 
certainly qualifies as a matter of “political, social, or other concern to 
the community,” which is how the Court has defined “public con-
cern” under the public employee doctrine.163  Additionally, if off-duty 
or not in combat, any political statements cannot be deemed as made 
“pursuant to [his] official duties,” so he would satisfy the first prong 
of the public employment test.164  In cases like Parker, where the 
speaker was in the military and speaking in his capacity as a military 
doctor, the Court could permissibly find that he had no right to 
speak.165  In cases like Howe, however, where the speaker was not 
speaking in his military capacity, the Court would move on to the 
second prong.166 
Next, the Court would decide whether the “relevant government 
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differ-
ently from . . . the general public.”167  Any restrictions imposed “must 
be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s 
operations.”168  Political dissent by off-duty, non-uniformed officers 
does not have the potential to derail the military from its objectives, 
 
163 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
164 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). 
165 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
166 United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165 (1967).  It is of course possible for speech that oc-
curs in a non-military capacity to affect the function of the military; for example, an off-
duty officer could divulge classified information.  I would argue that the First Amend-
ment would not protect this speech.  For purposes of this Comment, however, I focus on 
speech that will not affect the function of the military and therefore should be protected. 
167 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
168 Id. 
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so the military could not constitutionally prohibit this type of speech.  
The Supreme Court has long abandoned the idea that speaking 
against an ongoing war effort is dangerous enough to justify infring-
ing on the First Amendment.169  Also, this speech would not imply 
that soldiers are bringing discredit on the military under Article 
134.170  If a soldier attends a rally out of uniform, who is going to 
know he is a soldier?  But again, under this prong, the military could 
rightly prohibit speech like that in Parker because it would impact his 
employer’s ability to conduct business. 
By applying the public employee doctrine to military speech regu-
lations, the Supreme Court could adequately balance the interests of 
service members in exercising their free speech rights with the inter-
ests of the military in ensuring effective operations.  The Court could 
then intelligently determine those cases in which they should defer to 
military judgment—for example, cases which implicate combat situa-
tions—and those in which they should not.  By doing so, the Court 
would be serving the interests of the American people by ensuring 
both the protection of civil liberties and the safety of the nation. 
Illustrative of how this rubric would lead to more just results by 
punishing only speech relevant to military operations is the contrast 
between the Supreme Court’s decision in Rankin v. McPherson171 and a 
military court’s decision in United States v. Ogren.172  The facts of the 
cases are similar.  Both involved employees—in Rankin, a clerical em-
ployee of the police department, in Ogren, a naval officer—who spoke 
in favor of a presidential assassination.173  In Rankin, the Court ap-
plied the public employee doctrine and found that the speech was 
protected political discussion.174  In Ogren, the military declared the 
 
169 The evolution of the “clear and present danger” doctrine tracks the status of protection 
of political dissent under the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court initially endorsed 
the prohibition of political dissent in wartime because it might jeopardize the war effort.  
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  The Court’s more recent decision in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, however, discredited this reasoning and held that an individual’s 
speech may be restricted only if the individual intends to, and his speech is likely to, pro-
duce imminent lawless action.  395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  The Brandenburg decision in-
corporated the ideas Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed in his dissent in Abrams v. 
United States, an earlier case discussing free speech in wartime, that, while wartime dan-
gers justify increased government power, Congress cannot manipulate public opinion by 
outlawing political dissent.  250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Recogniz-
ing the dangers of restrictions on political dissent, Holmes stated:  “Congress certainly 
cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country.”  Id. 
170 U.C.M.J. art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006)). 
171 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
172 54 M.J. 481 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 
173 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380; Ogren, 54 M.J. at 481. 
174 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392. 
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speech devoid of political meaning and held that it constituted a true 
threat to the President, despite the fact that Ogren, like the plaintiff 
in Rankin, had no means or intention of actually harming the Com-
mander-in-Chief.175 
2.  Reviewing Speech Regulations Through the Public Employee Rubric is 
More Consistent with First Amendment Theory 
Reviewing military speech regulations from a public employee 
doctrine perspective would lead to results much more compatible 
with First Amendment theory.  The public employee doctrine would 
allow service members to engage in political discussion or protest 
while off-duty and out of uniform, thereby facilitating the free flow of 
ideas into society.  This type of discussion is protected expressly un-
der a marketplace of ideas view of the First Amendment.176 
Political dissent serves the marketplace of ideas theory by contrib-
uting beliefs and information to the public discourse.  The best way 
for the public to determine the truth on an issue, political or not, is 
to hear information supporting all sides.177  Justice William Brennan 
recognized that the United States has always embraced a “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks 
on government and public officials.”178  Only through this sort of de-
 
175 Ogren, 54 M.J. at 484, 488. 
176 The “marketplace of ideas” theory, sometimes called the “search for truth” theory, argues 
that the most effective way to determine “truth” is to allow the unrestricted flow of ideas 
into the market—a type of “laissez faire” economics of ideas.  The truth, proponents of 
the theory argue, emerges from the clash of conflicting opinions.  See JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY (London, John W. Parker and Son 1859).  Alexander Meiklejohn takes a 
slightly different stance on this theory, applying it to the democratic sphere.  He argues 
that political dissent is essential to a democratic society—because democracy is, by defini-
tion, about self-government, speech relating to issues with which voters deal should be 
privileged above all other speech.  In his view, political dissent is required for voters to ef-
fectively determine the truth about the issues with which they are concerned.  ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (referenced in 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 6 (1st ed. 1999)).  
While academics have criticized Meiklejohn’s view as too narrow to encompass the en-
tirety of the First Amendment, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 
(1949) (reviewing MEIKLEJOHN, supra), the notion that political dissent is vital to the 
health of a democratic society has long been a bedrock of First Amendment jurispru-
dence.  See SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 47. 
177 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[T]he ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
178 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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bate will the truth about the current political climate emerge, making 
it incredibly important to allow everyone access to the marketplace. 
If the point of protecting free speech is the search for truth, then 
no better way exists to achieve this end than to allow free flow of opi-
nions from those who have firsthand knowledge of an important is-
sue.  Soldiers understand, more than any civilian ever could, the fun-
damental problems with the administration’s logic and planning.  
Therefore, they are best situated to inform the rest of the public 
about the problems with the current administration.  By putting these 
thoughts into the marketplace of ideas, they can inspire others.  If 
other citizens are persuaded, they can voice their opinions through 
their votes and maybe make the government more responsive.  Simi-
larly, speech about wartime policy or wartime politics is essential to 
an informed electorate, particularly during contentious times, like 
the 2008 election, where a war became the focal point of both candi-
dates’ campaigns.  Restricting those most informed from speaking 
out on such central issues runs contrary to the most fundamental 
ideas of the First Amendment. 
Political dissent also strongly implicates the First Amendment lib-
erty interest.  Speech is a powerful tool in an individual’s quest for 
self-definition.  As Edwin Baker observes, war protestors do not 
march or chant in opposition to a war because they assume that do-
ing so will end the conflict—or even because they assume that the 
government will take notice of their protest.179  They protest in order 
to “define [themselves] publicly . . . in opposition to the war.”180  These 
war protestors provide an “illustration of the importance of this self-
expressive use of speech, independent of any expected communica-
tion to others, for self-fulfillment or self-realization.”181 
Similarly, if a service member does not believe in the policies of 
his nation, he should not be forced to adopt those policies as his own.  
Like Baker’s protester, the soldier does not expect the war to end as a 
result of his speech,182 nor is he actively trying to impede the military 
efforts.  Rather, he is establishing himself as someone who does not 
believe in the direction the President is steering the country.  There-
 
179 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 53 (1989). 
180 Id. (emphasis added). 
181 Id.  Additionally, people define themselves by the groups which they join.  According to 
Shiffrin, “[d]issent is predominantly a form of social engagement . . . . [T]o promote dis-
sent is to promote engaged association.”  SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 91.  Dissent provides a 
means for individuals to express their innermost selves and present their beliefs to soci-
ety.  To prohibit such behavior would eliminate much of the wonderful diversity of 
American society, as well as damper the enthusiasm of activists across the nation.  See id. 
182 See BAKER, supra note 179, at 53. 
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fore, his speech does not actively interfere with the government’s op-
erations, but it allows him to establish his own person and present 
that person to the world, unencumbered by beliefs that he does not 
hold as his own. 
Take, for example, Lieutenant Howe’s case.183  By protesting the 
war, Howe did not directly encourage his fellow soldiers to drop their 
arms.  He publicly questioned the government’s policy choices, ra-
ther than the movements of the military itself.  Just as civilians can 
support the troops in Iraq but not the Bush administration’s policy 
for going to war in the country, members of the military can execute 
their jobs without subscribing to the policies of the Commander-in-
Chief.  The military encourages discipline, loyalty, and duty above all 
else, and soldiers take these principles very seriously.  That they may 
have political feelings that differ from those of the President, and the 
desire to express those feelings as a means of self-definition, does not 
mean that they will renounce all of their military training. 
3.  Courts Already Apply Public Employee Doctrine Across the Board to 
Government Employees, Including Those Involved in National 
Security 
Both federal courts and state courts have applied the public em-
ployee doctrine to employees in every public agency, except for the 
military.  These courts have invoked the doctrine to decide free 
speech cases related to almost every single public office.  This across-
the-board application of the doctrine significantly undermines the 
Supreme Court’s claim that the government’s security interests justify 
a complete political dissent in the case of the military. 
Circuit courts and state courts have applied the doctrine to cover 
cases involving public employees from practically every government 
entity.184  Most importantly for purposes of this Comment, lower 
 
183 See United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165 (1967). 
184 See Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (declaring that public employee doctrine applied to employees in higher 
education); Philip v. Cronin, 537 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that public employee 
doctrine applied to physician in Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for Massachusetts); 
Jordan v. Ector County, 516 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that public employee doc-
trine protected political speech made by county clerk); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees 
Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying doctrine to labor union and 
member of Transportation Security Administration); McFall v. Bednar, 407 F.3d 1081 
(10th Cir. 2005) (using public employee doctrine to decide case involving Oklahoma In-
digent Defense System); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003) (reviewing 
claim of public high school teacher under public employee doctrine); Yniguez v. Arizo-
nans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying public employee doc-
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courts have applied the public employee doctrine to cases involving 
other government agencies charged with protecting America’s na-
tional security interests.  In M.K. v. Tenet, the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit recognized that the public employee doctrine applies to 
cases involving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).185  The same 
court applied the doctrine to a case brought by a teacher hired by the 
United States Navy against the Department of Defense and actually 
found for the teacher.186  The teacher had been hired to teach mili-
tary dependents and was not officially a member of the armed ser-
vices, but the court used the public employee doctrine to find against 
the United States Navy.187  In Lister v. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), a 
federal district court applied the public employee doctrine to find 
that the DLA’s policy restricting speech on religious and political is-
sues violated the First Amendment.188  And in Wright v. FBI, the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia applied Pickering and its prog-
eny to a case brought by current and former FBI agents.189 
Courts have protected political speech by other government em-
ployees, as well.190  For example, the Fifth Circuit noted that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from penalizing its employees 
“solely for not being supporters of the political party in power, unless 
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position in-
 
trine to employees in Department of Administration); Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (applying public employee doctrine to prison official fighting transfer); In re 
Gonzalez, 964 A.2d 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (using public employee doctrine 
to decide case brought by detective employed by state government agency); Alderman v. 
Pocahontas County Bd. of Ed., 675 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 2009) (applying doctrine to mem-
ber of Board of Education); Snelling v. City of Claremont, 931 A.2d 1272 (N.H. 2007) 
(applying public employee doctrine to decide case brought by city assessor against city 
and city manager). 
185 216 F.R.D. 133, 138 n.5 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that, while not applicable at this stage of 
litigation, the court would apply public employee doctrine to member of the CIA); see also 
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972) (stating that CIA employee re-
tained right to criticize the Agency but was precluded from publishing a book about his 
experiences because of confidentiality agreement signed as condition of employment).  
Lower courts have also applied the doctrine to cases brought against the CIA by employ-
ees of other government agencies.  See, e.g., Hall v. Dworkin, 829 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D.N.Y. 
1993) (applying public employee doctrine to case brought against CIA). 
186 Ring v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying public employee doctrine to 
case brought against the Department of Defense). 
187 Id. 
188 482 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that public employee doctrine prohib-
ited DLA from denying plaintiff ability to express views on abortion and religious prefer-
ence). 
189 613 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2009). 
190 See Jordan v. Ector County, 516 F.3d 290, 301 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that public em-
ployee doctrine protected political speech in county clerk’s office). 
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volved.”191  The military has never indicated that political affiliation is 
a prerequisite for serving in the armed forces. 
These courts also use the public employee doctrine to decide free 
speech cases brought by and against local law enforcement, the civil-
ian version of the military.192  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit has con-
cluded that a police officer’s speech criticizing the policies imple-
mented by her commanding officers is protected under the First 
Amendment, recognizing that criticism does not automatically lead 
to insubordination.193 
In the aforementioned cases, the courts did not always find that 
the plaintiffs’ speech interests outweighed the government’s interest 
in protecting national security.  Nevertheless, these cases indicate that 
federal courts have consistently applied the public employee doctrine 
to decide whether that security interest really does outweigh an em-
ployee’s right to exercise political dissent and to criticize his or her 
superiors.  The military remains the lone unit of government exempt 
from the public employee doctrine, and the wealth of cases applying 
the doctrine to other security agencies greatly undermines the weight 
of the “defense is different” rationale. 
4.  Deference Gone Awry:  Too Deferential a Stance Leads to Corruption 
and Abuse of Power 
The government’s interest in national security is a vital one.  This 
interest, however, is not best served by leaving the military with com-
plete control over every aspect of its operations and without any ac-
countability to other branches of government.  The military may not 
use the fear of terrorist attacks to hold the Supreme Court hostage, to 
silence all opposition to military objectives, or to stifle all information 
that might cast the military in a poor light.  The government must 
not only maintain the safety of the American people, but it must act 
in people’s best interest while doing so.  National security interests do 
not justify an abuse of the public trust, which has previously occurred 
when the Supreme Court has taken too deferential a stance on mili-
 
191 Id. at 295. 
192 See, e.g., Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that city 
police officer’s testimony regarding corruption in higher ranks is protected under public 
employee doctrine); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying public 
employee doctrine to police department’s involvement in parade); McFall v. Bednar, 407 
F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2005) (using public employee doctrine to decide case involving Ok-
lahoma Indigent Defense System). 
193 See Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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tary regulations.194  The Supreme Court should hold the military to a 
higher standard, and one way to achieve this is to apply the public 
employee doctrine. 
United States v. Reynolds exemplifies this principle.195  In Reynolds, 
the Supreme Court first recognized the “state secrets” privilege.196  
This privilege allows the government to get a claim dismissed or to 
keep evidence out of a trial if entertaining either would jeopardize 
military secrets or national security.197  The Supreme Court has been 
incredibly deferential to military claims under the state secrets doc-
trine as well as in cases involving speech restrictions.198  This deferen-
tial policy, however, has backfired on the Court, with the military ab-
using its power and claiming privilege over information crucial to 
public discourse.199 
The military manipulated the Supreme Court in order to gain 
protection in the very case upon which the state secrets doctrine is 
based—Reynolds.200  That case involved an investigation into the crash 
of an Air Force plane in the dawn of the Cold War.201  The Secretary 
of the Air Force refused to turn over information on the plane, claim-
ing that doing so would jeopardize the security of the United States.202  
The Court suppressed the report based on the military’s claim that 
secrecy was vital to national security.203  The Air Force declassified the 
report fifty years later, and it contained not a single reference to na-
tional security.204  Rather, it suggested that the crash occurred because 
the Air Force negligently maintained the aircraft.205 
 
194 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People:  Notes 
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2008) (explaining how, fifty years 
after the Supreme Court deferred to military judgment about the dangers to national se-
curity of releasing information about an Air Force plane crash, the public discovered that 
the military had been lying to cover its mistakes). 
195 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
196 Id. at 7–8. 
197 See Compensating Victims of Wrongful Detention, Torture, and Abuse in the U.S. War on Terror, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 1163 (2009). 
198 See id. 
199 See Weinstein, supra note 194, at 95 (“[T]he Executive Branch of our people’s govern-
ment has used the privilege to hide critical information from the people.”). 
200 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
201 Id. at 2. 
202 See generally id. 
203 Id. at 3–4. 
204 See Edward Lazarus, Book Review, ‘Claim of Privilege:  A Mysterious Plane Crash, a Landmark 
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The military’s claim that national security interests justify state se-
crets privilege has proven fraudulent in other cases, as well.  Recently, 
the military has used the state secrets doctrine to dismiss lawsuits 
brought by innocent men who were tortured as terror suspects. 206  
The military and the CIA justified their interrogation procedures in 
the name of national security.207  But when the details of the pro-
grams were revealed, it became clear that the military was exaggerat-
ing the threat to national security to gain judicial approval of its prac-
tices.208 
The Supreme Court recently has recognized the danger of allow-
ing the government to use national security to justify practices that 
infringe on civil liberties.  The Court heard arguments on Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld on April 28, 2004.209  Hamdi discussed the right to habeas 
corpus proceedings in the wake of a 2001 statute210 authorizing the 
government to use any means necessary to find and jail members of 
Al-Qaeda.  That same day, photos surfaced of American soldiers tor-
turing prisoners of war at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.211  The 
Court ruled against the government, stating that the government’s 
desire to protect the American people did not justify denying prison-
ers their constitutional right to receive notice of the factual basis for 
their imprisonment.212  While the Hamdi opinion did not specifically 
mention Abu Ghraib, Steven Shapiro, national legal director for the 
American Civil Liberties Union, declared that “it is hard to believe 
that [Abu Ghraib] did not affect the court and reinforce its view that 
unchecked power invites abuse.”213 
 
206 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert denied 128 S. Ct. 373 
(2007) (challenging privilege as extended to extraordinary rendition program allowing 
military to torture innocent terror suspects); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (claiming privilege in instance of deportation of innocent terror suspect 
to Syrian prison for interrogation); see also Editorial, A Judicial Green Light for Torture, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at C11 (discussing Arar case as example of “[t]he administration’s 
tendency to dodge accountability for lawless actions by resorting to secrecy and claims of 
national security”). 
207 See supra note 206. 
208 See, e.g., Editorial, Too Many Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2007, at A12 (discussing how gov-
ernment exaggerated threat to national security that would come from allowing chal-
lenge to extraordinary rendition to proceed). 
209 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
210 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001). 
211 See Joan Biskupic, High Court Protected Liberties by Limiting Presidential Power, USA TODAY, 
July 2, 2004, at 4A. 
212 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532 (stating that, after weighing government’s security concerns, 
government program does not “strike[] the proper constitutional balance”). 
213 Biskupic, supra note 211. 
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These cases illustrate some of the dangers that arise when the Su-
preme Court permits the government to use national security con-
cerns as a basis for infringing on constitutional liberties.  The gov-
ernment must be accountable for its actions, and it should not be 
allowed to use fears of a national security catastrophe to justify regu-
lations that prohibit activities that do not implicate the security inter-
est.  If the Court were to apply the public employee doctrine to mili-
tary speech regulations, it would be able to siphon out cases in which 
the security interest is, in fact, implicated and deprive service mem-
bers of the right to free speech when, and only when, it would be ne-
cessary to do so to ensure national security. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Military speech regulations prohibit service members from engag-
ing in political dissent.  Political dissent is speech that remains at the 
heart of the First Amendment and that is most entitled to its protec-
tion.  While members of the armed services do sacrifice some of the 
freedoms that civilians enjoy for the sake of the military’s objectives, 
freedoms that do not inhibit those objective should not be restricted.  
General public employee doctrine indicates that employees, when 
speaking as citizens on a matter of public concern, are free to discuss 
any topic they wish unless their speech will impact their employer’s 
ability to function.  By applying this model to military speech regula-
tions, federal courts will achieve more just results. 
Many employees do not like their jobs or the career path that they 
have chosen, but this sentiment does not mean that their employers 
can fire them for saying so.  Members of the armed forces, the very 
citizens who make the ultimate sacrifice and place their lives in jeop-
ardy to preserve American freedoms, should not be denied those 
freedoms, except under circumstances that would jeopardize the ef-
forts of the military. 
Our security surely depends, in part, on our free speech tradition 
of dissent.  As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]hose who begin coer-
cive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dis-
senters.  Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the un-
animity of the graveyard.”214 
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